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The Primary Markets:
I. Introduction
Venezuela is currently in the midst of a major program of planned develop-
ment of its domestic capital market.' This program is only one of numerous
planned capital market development efforts recently undertaken in the
developing world.2 Underlying this program is the fundamental belief by
Venezuelan economic planners that financial development is essential to en-
sure continued economic growth. Development of the capital market reflects
the government's.decision to utilize the debt-asset (or finance) system as a ma-
jor savings and investment mechanism in Venezuela.
The debt-asset system is one way in which a nation is able to elicit savings
from its people. The system is voluntary-as opposed to an involuntary system
which could rely on taxation or inflation to elicit savings-and utilizes the free
market to make a determination as to how capital resources will be allocated.
The, system uses financial institutions to create and channel financial assets
which are voluntarily purchased and held by people. Obvious examples of
these assets are stocks, bonds and convertible debentures.'
*Mr. Johnson is a senior law student at Southern Methodist Universitv School of Law.
fEditor's Note: "Part Il-The Secondary Markets" will appear in the Spring issue of The In-
ternational Lawyer.
*The author notes that this article was written in the period from January, 1977 through May,
1977. Several legislative changes in Venezuela have taken place since the article was written and
went to press. Decree 62, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1220-21 (1974) was replaced by Decree 2031 of
February 8, 1977. Decree 63, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1221-34 (1974) was replaced by Decree 2442
of November 15, 1977. These legislative changes, although important in terms of Venezuela's
foreign investment law, do not significantly affect the substance or basic analysis which is the prin-
ciple focus of this article.
'Oil, Democracy, Development, ECONOMIST, Dec. 27, 1975, at Survey 3.
'Roth, Capital Market Development in Israel and Brazil: Two Examples of the Role of Law in
Development, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1277-1306 (1967).
'B. Carl, International Economic Development Law 11, 91 (1977) (unpublished manuscript).
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Three basic requirements must be met if the debt-asset system is to effective-
ly generate savings. First, potential savers and investors must be willing to hold
financial paper in expectation of future profits. In effect, the saving and in-
vesting public must have sufficient faith in the system to forego present con-
sumption for future gains. Second, intermediate financial institutions such as
stock exchanges and mutual funds must exist and function so as to collect and
channel the funds. Third, a relatively efficient private law system is necessary.,
This paper examines a key aspect of the Venezuelan program-those
policies and laws designed to stimulate the growth of the securities markets,
and thus to increase the flow of capital to companies through the sale of equity
and debt securities. Capital markets here are defined as the complex of institu-
tions and mechanisms whereby intermediate and long-term funds are pooled
and made available to business, government, and individuals, and whereby in-
struments already outstanding are transferred.' The securities market, a part
of the capital market, includes two distinct components. The "primary"
market (also referred to as the "issue" market) refers to transactions in newly
issued securities, where funds are transferred to companies in exchange for dif-
ferent types of securities. A primary objective is always to stimulate and ex-
pand this market. The "secondary" market refers to the exchange of securities
already in circulation. Such transactions constitute a transfer of preexisting
financial assets. A basic assumption is that an active, well-organized, and effi-
cient "secondary" market is necessary for a viable "primary" market. The
former is to provide liquidity for financial assets negotiated in the latter.6
Included in this paper are the history, description, and analysis of the
Venezuelan program, with special emphasis on the apparent goals selected,
measures utilized, results to date, and suggestions for the future. The central
and unifying feature of the paper is the effect of the legal system in shaping
Venezuela's capital market program. The Venezuelan case provides a unique
insight into the role of law and legal systems in economic development. Law
reform and economic regulation in this instance provide concrete examples of
planning devices designed and utilized to develop private sector financial in-
stitutions. Clearly, however, as the author understands and as will be apparent
throughout this paper, the law is only one of many factors which have led to
the evolution of the program.
Unlike most developing countries, Venezuela is in an economic position
which is both enviable and encouraging. Oil revenues for 1976-the govern-
ment's largest source of income-were conservatively estimated at $5.7
'Id.
1H. DOUGALL, CAPITAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 5 (1970).
'A. BASCH AND M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 65 (1970).
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billion.' Per capita income for 1976 was approximately $2,200.8 Gross Na-
tional Product increased 5.5 percent in 1975, and registered a 6 percent in-
crease for 1976.1 The country's current five year development plan-total in-
vestment of $52 billion, with a projected average annual increase in Gross Na-
tional Product of 8.3 percent-is well underway. '°
Given these optimistic figures, why then is Venezuela expected to borrow
abroad approximately $4-15 billion over the next five year period? ' ' Three
closely intertwined factors have contributed to this situation. First, the country
has embarked on an unprecedented economic development program designed
to diversify the economy away from its oil base.' 2 Second, a continuing decline
in petroleum revenue has forced the government to consider obtaining finance
on the world market for its ambitious development plans.' 3 Third, the
demands and dimensions of this development program are so immense that the
country's capital market structure is simply not able to generate the domestic
savings needed to finance the planned economic diversification. 4
In order to better understand the Venezuelan capital market's shortcomings,
it is first necessary to consider the circumstances under which the problem
arose and continues to exist to a large extent. Although the country has moved
rapidly toward becoming an industrialized nation since World War II, the
Venezuelan stock markets have not been an important factor in supplying
capital for the growth and maintenance of Venezuela's industries. The reasons
for this lackluster performance are numerous, and generally reflect the fact
that development of a securities market is a long and tedious process, the suc-
cess of which depends on the favorable interaction of various factors. Until
recently the successful mix of factors was neither present nor possible in
Venezuela. '
A prerequisite for the development of an active and efficient securities
market is a relatively lengthy and uninterrupted period of economic and
political stability. This stability is a basic condition for winning the confidence
of the investing public. The rather serious consequences of political instability
and an uncertain economic future, in terms of the business climate and in-
'10 BANK OF LONDON & SOUTH AMERICA REPORT 232 (April, 1976).
' Why Not a Eurobond? EUROMONEY, Dec. 1976, at 19.
'10 BANK OF LONDON & SOUTH AMERICA REPORT 231 (April, 1976).
" Venezuela's Five-Year Plan: Long on Ambitious Goals, Short on Implementation, BUSINESS
LATIN AMERICA, May 19, 1976, at 155, 158.
"Keep It in Cash, ECONOMIST. April 17, 1976, at 73.
" Venezuela's Five- Year Plan: Long on Ambitious Goals, Short on Implementation, BUSINESS
LATIN AMERICA, May 19, 1976, at 155, 158.
"Focus on Venezuela: The Rainbow and Pot of Gold Are Beginning to Fade, BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA, Jan. 28, 1976, at 26-27.
"Keep It in Cash, ECONOMIST, April 17, 1976, at 73.
I'M. HASSAN, ECONOMIST GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT PROBLEMS IN VENEZUELA 40 (1975).
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vestor reaction, are exemplified by the massive capital outflow which Vene-
zuela experienced from 1958-1963. Factors contributing to this crisis included
four consecutive years of government deficits, lack of confidence in a fledgling
coalition of democratic government, continuing student and peasant unrest,
and a temporary decline in oil profitability in Venezuela. The result of this
uncertain situation was that companies and investors in Venezuela were unable
to secure needed investment capital or dependable investment returns. The
capital outflow was not reversed until 1964, when favorablel economic condi-
tions and strong government policies halted the precipitous slide.' 6
It is only in approximately the last 15 years that Venezuela has achieved a
measure of combined economic and political stability so as to pursue a coor-
dinated program of economic development. In the period from 1947 to the
present, Venezuelan economic conditions were generally favorable in com-
parison to other developing countries. This favorable economic situation was
due principally to the country's massive reliance upon oil revenues. During this
time there was a sizable increase in total government revenues, establishment
of basic manufacturing and agricultural industries, maintenance of the bolivar
as a stable international currency, and continuation of an overall low infla-
tionary rate.' 7 Political stability however, was much more difficult to achieve.
Democracy was only restored in 1959, and the country experienced its first
peaceful change of government in 1964. Given favorable economic and
political developments since 1974, it is reasonably safe to believe that
Venezuela has achieved a degree of stability 'unmatched in most developing
countries, and certainly unmatched anywhere in Latin America."
A second factor which has seriously impeded a rapid and vigorous develop-
ment of the Venezuelan securities market is the traditional Latin American at-
titude toward investment, which is best described as overly cautious and
generally indifferent. Private businesses tend to rely on self-financing and are
reluctant to accept outside equity participation. Often companies are family-
owned or else controlled by a small closed group. Investment requirements are
preferably financed with personal savings or bank loans or credits."
Coupled with the wary attitude of companies toward accepting outside in-
vestors is the absence-until recently, at least-of large numbers of small in-
vestors, who are obviously necessary for the development and continuing li-
quidity of any securities market. Adding to the overall absence of a sizable
number of small investors is the traditional preference of those investors who




"How to Grow, ECONOMIST, Dec. 27, 1975, at Survey 10-11.
"A. BASCH AND M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 154 (1970).2 01d.
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A third factor which restricted the growth of the securities market was the
lack of an effective legal and institutional framework which was capable of
providing minority shareholder protection.2 This situation is best exemplified
by looking at the small number of basic legal safeguards available to
hypothetical Venezuelan investor Juan Diaz in the 1960s. Senor Diaz made a
$1,000 investment in C.A. Telares de Caracas [hereinafter referred to as
CATC], and as a result obtained 100 shares (at $10 per share) of the com-
pany's stock. The company's total number of outstanding shares during this
hypothetical period remained constant at 10,000. Assuming Senor Diaz did
not increase his equity investment, he controlled one percent of the company
stock and was clearly a minority shareholder. Control of CATC during this
period remained in the hands of the Sanchez brothers, Emilio and Jorge, who
together owned eighty-three percent (8,300) of the outstanding shares of stock.
The Venezuelan Commercial Code is the starting point to determine the
minority shareholder protection afforded to Senor Diaz. The code reserved to
the state the power to ensure that companies fulfilled the legal requirements in
regard to their organization and functioning.22 This supervisory authority was
quite limited however, since the only organ that exercised such function was
the Commercial Register, whose intervention consisted merely of receiving,
approving, and filing the necessary documents and financial reports (basically
an annual profit and loss statement). If the CATC had not complied with its
duty to register the necessary documents, then the Commercial Register ap-
parently was without authority to force the company to do so. 23 In fact, prior
to 1973 there did not exist any state organ which supervised in any manner the
ongoing activities of companies.
As a shareholder in CATC, Senor Diaz naturally desired to keep abreast of
the company's financial condition. His right of inspection in this regard was
quite limited however. The code did not provide for an individual share-
holder's right of inspection of company books and records.2 ' A major obstacle
to any inspection of company books or records was the code's provision that
no court or official authority was permitted to investigate whether books were
maintained, and in case they were, if they were maintained according to the
specifications of the code.25 The code further prohibited any general examina-
"Id. 154-55.
1O. Lazo, Codigo de Comercio de Venezuela, art. 200, at 231 (1962). [hereinafter referred to as
"Codigo de Comercio"].
2 3 CEMLA, EL MERCADO DE CAPITALES EN VENEZUELA 22 (1968). [hereinafter referred to as
CEMLA].
24Compare this to shareholder rights of inspection provided by TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art.
2.44(B).
"Codigo de Comercio, art. 40, at 110.
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tion of company books, except in case of liquidation, succession, or bank-
ruptcy.26
The code, however, did provide for one or more "comisarios" (independent
auditors), who were to be elected at shareholder meetings." These independent
auditors were theoretically supposed to review the financial condition of the
company, attend the shareholder meetings, and prepare reports on the action
taken by the board of directors.28 In regard to the annual shareholders'
meeting, the comisarios were to receive from the board of directors, one
month in advance of the meeting, a report on the financial condition of the
company.29 The comisarios were then required to prepare their report for
distribution to the shareholders at least 15 days prior to the date of the annual
meeting." ,3' If in fact the comisarios of CATC were typical of the period, they
would most likely arrive at the meeting 30 minutes before it began, "examine"
the financial statements and sign a report prepared by some official of
CATC.32 In effect, Senor Diaz would have no advance notice of the com-
pany's financial condition since the code did not require publication of finan-
cial statements, nor that such statements be sent by mail to registered
shareholders.33
The comisarios were not required to be shareholders, nor were they required
to have any special training or qualifications.3" The real importance of the
comisario was found in his right to unlimited inspection of all the company's
books, registers, and documents.33 In the case of Senor Diaz, however, the
CATC comisarios were of little value, since both had been "elected" previous-
ly by the controlling Sanchez brothers.
Senor Diaz also had the right, when he considered it proper or believed that
CATC was being poorly administered, to demand that the comisarios in-
vestigate the complaint and make a report at the next shareholders meeting.
However, Senor Diaz' demand would only be effective if his claim was sup-
ported by at least ten percent of the shareholders.36
Given the strong probability that the comisarios of CATC would not act to
investigate any of Senor Diaz' allegations of wrongdoing, Senor Diaz was still
able to avail himself of one additional protective device. If he could marshall
2 Codigo de Comercio, art. 41, at 113.
"Codigo de Comercio, art. 287, at 319.
"Codigo de Comercio, art. 311, at 365.
"Codigo de Comercio, art. 304, at 359.
"Codigo de Comercio, art. 284, at 318.
3Codigo de Comercio, art. 306, at 360.
"CEMLA, at 24.
"3/d.
'Codigo de Comercio, arts. 309-11, at 363-65.
"Codigo de Comercio, art. 309, at 363.
'"Codigo de Comercio, art. 310, at 363.
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the support of at least twenty percent of the shareholders, he would be able to
file a complaint in a commercial court. This court was given the authority in
these matters to name court-appointed investigators to study the claim and
make a report to the court. The expenses of this entire process were to be borne
by the plaintiff.3 7 If the court found Senor Diaz' claim to be unfounded, it
would dismiss it. If Senor Diaz' claim was found to be justifiable, then the
only remedy that the court could dictate would be to call a special shareholders
meeting.38 The obvious problem facing Senor Diaz in this case was that even
this remedy would be of no avail, since the alleged wrongdoing directors con-
trolled eighty-three percent of the CATC stock, and therefore made it impossi-
ble to obtain the twenty percent of shareholders required to present the claim
before a court. In the unlikely event that any action could be taken against the
board of directors of CATC, it was doubtful that any sanctions or corrective
measures could be applied, since all shareholder actions or resolutions in this
regard could be undertaken only by decision of all assembled shareholders."
As a minority shareholder, Senor Diaz was further hampered by the code's
failure to specifically provide for the election of the board of directors through
cumulative voting. Article 292 of the code merely provided that shares were to
be of equal value and that shareholders were to have equal rights. ° The bylaws
of CATC, not unexpectedly, did not provide for the board to be elected
through cumulative voting. As a result, Senor Diaz was most likely prevented
from having himself or other minority shareholders being elected to the board
and reporting any manner in which CATC was being mismanaged.
If Senor Diaz suspected that the Sanchez brothers were utilizing to their ex-
clusive benefit information obtained as a result of their position on the board
of directors (a common example being being engaged in the purchase or sale of
CATC shares on the Caracas stock exchange on the basis of inside informa-
tion),' there was nothing he could do since the code provided no legal sanc-
tions whatsoever for this type of activity.42
The shortcomings of the old legal and institutional framework which con-
fronted small investors such as Senor Diaz resulted in widespread investor
preference for fixed-income securities such as corporate bonds and govern-
ment bonds. Preference for this type of security investment, compared to com-
"Compare this to TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.44(C).
"Codigo de Comercio, art. 291, at 333-34.
"Codigo de Comercio, art. 310, at 363.
'"Codigo de Comercio, art. 292, at 342.
'A 1968 study of the Venezuelan capital markets, undertaken by the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank and the private investment firm Deltec Panamerica, S.A., noted that there were
reported many notorious incidents involving insider trading. Unfortunately, the study did not in-
dicate specifically when these abuses occurred or the companies and individuals involved therein.
CEMLA, at 23.
'CEMLA, at 23.
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mon stocks for instance, was also due to the fixed-income securities' relatively
high degree of liquidity, favorable net yields, and the requirement that institu-
tional investors place a percentage of their resources in government
securities.
A fourth factor which impeded the development of the Venezuelan
securities market was the stock exchanges themselves and the manner in which
they functioned. Prior to 1974 two independent stock exchanges, the Bolsa de
Caracas and the Bolsa de Miranda, existed in the country." This factor by
itself presented a problem, since the actual volume of transactions on both the
exchanges was not sufficient to permit the approximately 60 active brokers to
obtain adequate revenues or profits. As a result, the number of brokers and
specialists dedicated solely to securities transactions remained quite small.4 '46
Self-regulation and application of disciplinary measures by the exchanges were
practically nonexistent.4 ,4  Any potential investor found that the re-
quirements for a company to list its securities with the exchanges were very
general and were applied in a lax manner. A company was able to request that
its securities be listed merely by writing a letter of application and enclosing
with it the charter, bylaws, and most recent financial statement. Once the com-
pany was listed, it was simply required to inform the exchange of any change
in its bylaws and to forward company financial statements on a periodic basis.
Failure to comply with those requirements supposedly led to the company los-
ing its listing. In fact, there are no indications that any listing request was ever
denied or that any penalties were ever applied.49'5 0
Characteristically, securities transactions on the two exchanges were weak
and narrow, with few issues being listed and only a select few of those being
traded regularly." Furthermore, there appeared to be rather significant
changes in the composition of the securities transactions, as evidenced by the
period from 1961 to 1969. Transactions for this period indicated a definite
shift away from equity shares and toward government bonds as shown on
Table I appearing on page 179.
'A. BASCH AND M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 153-54 (1970).
"D. EITEMAN, STOCK EXCHANGES IN LATIN AMERICA 54-65 (1966).
4'CEMLA, at 91.
"A. BASCH AND M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 154 (1970).
'CEMLA, at 92.
"A. BASCH AND M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 154 (1970).
49Id.
"CEMLA, at 94-96.
"A. BASCH AND M. KYBAL, CAPITAL MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA 53, 76, 152 (1970).
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TABLE I2
Combined Trading on Caracas and Miranda Stock Exchanges
According to Type of Security, 1961-69
(as percentage of total volume of trading)
Mortgage Bonds/
Government Financial Mortgage Company
Year Shares Bonds Bonds* Certificates* Obligations*
1961 28 64 3.0 5.0
1965 17 55 25.0 3.0
1967 8 73 1 15.6 1.6
1968 6 75 - 10.3 8.6
1969 7 67 19.3 6.3
*No definition available
In the late 1960s and 1970s a series of three events occurred which served to
stimulate a more rapid development of the country's securities markets. The
situation as it then existed clearly provided for a fertile environment for
change. The first event was the election of Acion Democratica's [hereinafter
referred to as AD] Carlos Andres Perez as president in 1973. The new AD ad-
ministration, sparked by its charismatic leader, pledged the government to a
program of rapid social and economic development.53 One of the govern-
ment's goals in this ambitious development program was to provide for a
wider distribution of the nation's wealth and capital.
Tlhe second major event took place fairly rapidly over a two-year period and
involved the quadrupling of world oil prices in late 1973 and early 1974. With
its heavy dependence on oil revenues, Venezuela has benefited tremendously
from the increased world oil prices." Government planners apparently
perceived that they possessed the means to achieve economic development in
less time and at less cost than ever before. At long last the country would be
able to diversify and develop the economy by means of the long-cherished
dream of "sowing the oil" (sembrar el petroleo)."1
"Id. at 70.
" Venezuela's AD Administration Makes Ambitious Pledges, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, March
20, 1974, at 74.
"Somewhat of an indication of the extent to which Venezuela benefited is reflected in GNP
figures for selected years. In 1972, one year prior to oil price increases, GNP was measured at
$12.20 billion. Market Indicators for 26 Latin American Countries, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA,
Dec. 26, 1973, at 414. In 1975, one year subsequent to the increase in oil prices, GNP was
measured at $29.57 billion. Market Indicators for 26 Latin American Countries, BUSINESS LATIN
AMERICA, Dec. 24, 1975, at 414.
"Plans and Strategems, ECONOMIST, Dec. 27, 1975, at Survey 20.
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The third significant event occurred in December 1973 when the Venezuelan
Congress approved the country's entry into the Andean Common Market. In-
cluded in this legislative action was ratification of Decision 24 of the Andean
Commission." Decision 24 (also referred to as the Andean Foreign Investment
Code, the AFIC, or the Code) established a minimum standard for the regula-
tion of foreign investment in each member country. Regulations for enforcing
the Code in Venezuela were promulgated in April 1974.11 These new foreign
investment regulations represented a conscious attempt by the government to
gain greater control over the activities of foreign investors and to channel their
investment activities into closer coordination with national development plans.
One important provision of Decision 24 deals with the divestment (also
referred to as fadeout) requirements for foreign companies operating in An-
dean Group countries. In Venezuela, any "new"" 8 foreign investments or
enterprises must agree to become "mixed" (by definition, at least 51 percent
Venezuelan-owned) within a 15-year period beginning January 1974." In the
case of companies which were established prior to 1974, the divestment re-
quirements must be met if they desire to utilize the Andean Group's free inter-
nal trade privileges. Additionally, Venezuelan legislation specifically provided
for the reservation of special sectors for "national" companies (by definition,
more than 80 percent Venezuelan-owned).60 This included public services
(telephone, mail, telecommunication, utilities, and security), domestic
transportation, television, radio, Spanish-language newspapers, advertising,
and domestic marketing companies. Divestment dates for foreign companies
already operating in these restricted sectors were set for May 1977.6 '
The divestment requirements of the Andean Foreign Investment Code have
set the stage for an interesting chain of events. Foreign companies are now re-
quired by Venezuelan law to sell to Venezuelan investors specified percentages
of their stock by established deadlines. Foreign companies subject to the
divestment requirements will be looking for investors. One obvious way in
which foreign companies could find the required number of investors within
the period of time allotted for their divestment is to make public offerings of
stock on the country's stock exchanges.
Given the fairly rigid divestment schedules, it was clear that Venezuela, if it
was to comply with the Andean Foreign Investment Code, would have to pro-
6Decision 24, I1 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126 (1972).
"Decree 62, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1220-21 (1974); Decree 63, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1221-34
(1974).
"Any investment or enterprise established after Jan. I, 1974. Decree 63, art. 19, 13 INT'L LEGAL
MAT'LS 1224 (1974).
"Id. art. 51, at 1229.
6°Decree 62, 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1220-21 (1974).
"Id. art. 2, at 1220.
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vide a mechanism whereby it would be possible to effectively carry through the
divestment program. In view of the government's allegedly strong commit-
ment to private enterprise and the free market system, it was only natural that
the country's capital markets would be considered to aid in the successful im-
plementation of the divestment requirement of the foreign investment code.
Having already noted the narrow, weak, and primitive nature of the existing
securities markets, it was apparently clear to economic planners that a major
reform effort was necessary if the divestment program and economic diver-
sification program were to succeed.
II. Primary Markets
With conditions ripe for the strengthening of the country's financial in-
frastructure, a deliberate decision was made by the government and certain
segments of the private business sector to develop the Venezuelan capital
market. The extent of the influence of the private sector in this decision is not
totally clear, but it appears to be significant. As early as 1968 Deltec
Panamerica, S.A., a subsidiary of Deltec International Limited, had engaged
in an extensive study of the future development of the Venezuelan securities
market. The recommendations of the Deltec study can be found in El Mercado
Capitales en Venezuela, published in 1968 by the Mexico City based Centro de
Estudios Monetarios Latinoamericanos. Also, in 1971-72, there was an exten-
sive study of Venezuela's financial markets conducted by the Capital Markets
Department of the World Bank's International Finance Corporation at the re-
quest of the Venezuelan Minister of Finance.
The result of the government and private business sector decision was the
Capital Markets Law of May 197362 followed by a reform version in May
1975.3 Basically these two laws were designed to regulate the issuance,
distribution, and trading of securities, as well as the operations of the various
individuals and institutions involved in such activities. The new legislation,
much like the Brazilian model on which it was based in part,4,65 accomplished
in a relatively short period of time what other more developed countries had
done over a longer period of time and through various laws and agencies.
Like the Federal Securities Act of 1933,66 the Venezuelan Capital Markets
2Ley de Mercado de Capitales, 339 GACETA LEGAL 2-15, Feb. 15, 1973. [hereinafter referred to
as "1973 Law"].
"Decree 882, 394 (Supp.) GACETA LEGAL 46-59, May 31, 1974.
"Poser, Securities Regulation in Developing Countries: The Brazilian Experience, 52 VA. L.
REV. 1283 (1966).
61D. Trubek, Law, Planning and Development of the Brazilian Capital Market (Bull. Nos.
72-73, April 1971).
1115 U.S.C. § 78a etseq., (1970).
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Law6 7' 6, relies heavily on registration and disclosure in regulating the public
distribution of securities. In its search for a suitable method of control for the
securities markets, the Venezuelan government was able to choose from three
possible models. One approach provides for the government to evaluate the in-
vestment merits of any security prior to allowing it to be offered to the public.
Some state blue-sky laws require a state agency to pass on the merits of a pro-
posed securities issue to protect public investors from worthless offerings.69
California at one time required that prior to an issue of securities a state com-
missioner find the proposed plan of business of the issuing company to be
"fair, just and equitable.''
In France, governmental control over the issuance and trading of securities
is based on overall national fiscal, economic, and political considerations. The
needs of the individual investor are of secondary importance only.7'
A second approach-far less rigorous than the California or French models
-is that followed in England, where there are few statutory controls. There,
underwriters and stock exchanges are responsible for screening issues offered
to the public. This self-control system is effective in protecting investors from
fraud for a number of reasons. Of primary importance is that underwriters'
reputations are at stake with every issue they support. Also, given the absence
of over-the-counter trading in England, any company desiring to make a
public offering of securities must list the securities on an exchange. New issues,
prior to being listed on an exchange, are carefully examined by a "new issues
committee" to ensure the investment merits of the issue as well as adequacy of
disclosure.72
A third approach, falling midway between the more rigorous Califor-
nia/French model and the less stringent English model, is the approach taken
in the Federal Securities Act of 1933,11 by which the federal government was
given the authority to force the disclosure of specified information. In this role
the federal government does not evaluate the investment merits of securities.7 '
It was the third approach which was adopted by Venezuela. It provided the
statutory and administrative basis for a system to rely primarily on registration
and disclosure. In opting for the United States registration/disclosure model
the Venezuelan government was forced to consider and balance a number of
important factors. The one factor which suggested implementing a rigorous
"6Ley de Mercado de Capitales, 339 GACETA LEGAL 2-15, Feb. 15, 1973.
6Decree 882, 394 (Supp.) GACETA LEGAL 46-59, May 31, 1974.
69Roth, Capital Market Development in Israel and Brazil: Two Examples of the Role of Law in
Development, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1277, 1289 (1967).
"Cal. Corp. Code § 25507 (West Supp. 1966).
7Roth, supra note 69, at 1277, 1289.
'2Id.
" 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., (1970).
"Roth, supra note 69, at 1277, 1289.
International Lawyer, Vol. 12, No. I
Venezuelan Securities Legislation-Part I
"on the merits" approach was that the system which existed prior to 1973 of-
fered little or no protection to the investor-as amply demonstrated by the
case of Senor Diaz and CATC-and as a result impeded public investment in
the securities market.' 5 This unhealthy situation was brought to light as early
as 1968, when a joint study by the Inter-American Development Bank and
Deltec Panamerica, S.A., noted the ineffective and unwieldy safeguards af-
forded by the Venezuelan Commercial Code 6 and the overall lack of public in-
vestor confidence in the securities markets." Although no specific incidents or
investigations are cited specifically, the Deltec report referred to rampant
abuses of minority shareholder rights by majority shareholders committed
during the 1950s and 1960s."5
A number of factors however, worked strongly against establishing a
regulatory system which would be too difficult for the government to imple-
ment and for companies and investors to comprehend. In the case of the
government there was and still continues an acute shortage of skilled and
qualified personnel to staff and fully implement a rigorous regulatory
system.' 9 Also, if regulatory measures were to be effective in a practical sense,
it would be necessary that the investing public understand what type of legal
protection was available. This problem takes on an added dimension when one
considers that any attempt to bring about widespread investor participation in
the securities markets would involve bringing a large number of new and
relatively unsophisticated investors into the market. In the case of the com-
panies, a rigorous regulatory system-complete with the inevitable red
tape-might actually have inhibited market development by deterring some
companies from going to the capital market for new financing. Given the
bleak prospect of having to deal with a potentially difficult system, many com-
panies would probably have chosen to either forego expansion or else seek
their traditional sources of funding.
It is important to note one manner in which the Venezuelan system is quite
different from the American model. In the case of Venezuela, the securities
regulation program was designed primarily for the purpose of developing and
building the securities markets. The protection of investors was simply one
means of attaining that goal. In contrast, the United States federal securities
legislation was intended primarily to protect investors, and secondarily to pro-
tect the national economy from excessive abuses growing out of the sale and
purchase of securities.
"Wiles, The Venezuelan Capital Markets Law, 8 INT'L LAW 305, 306 (1974).
"6CEMLA, at 21-25.
"Id. at 104.
7'Id. at 23, 104.
"Inchausti, Skilled Manpower Shortage Slows Venezuela Growth, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, April 29, 1977, at 18, col. 1.
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The scope and dimension of the disclosure requirements are quite broad.
Since these requirements were apparently based in large part on the Federal
Securities Act of 1933,80 the author will explain the key elements of this part of
the Venezuelan law through a comparison and contrast with relevant provi-
sions of the 1933 Act. It is noted that this is not intended to be an in-depth
description and analysis of the American securities regulations. Rather, this is
an attempt to highlight the similarities and differences which exist between the
two pieces of legislation.
Under the 1933 Act there is an express prohibition against the use of in-
terstate facilities or the mails to "offer to sell" a security unless a registration
statement has been filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC)." To facilitate the registration of securities the SEC has numerous
special registration forms. These different forms vary in their disclosure re-
quirements; however, their basic purpose remains the same-provide
disclosure of the essential facts pertinent to a given type of offering while at
the same time minimizing the burden and expense of compliance with the
law.8 The registration statement is designed to force disclosure of all factors
which may affect the fairness of the issue and the financial status of the cor-
poration. Full details must be provided as to the identity and background of
corporate officers and directors, compensation they receive, sales costs, and
underwriting commissions and discounts.83 In addition, the investors must be
furnished with a prospectus containing key information set forth in the
registration statement so as to enable them to make informed decisions.
8 4
Up to this point the Venezuelan law follows the general pattern of the 1933
Act; however, there are some important distinctions. Unlike its American
counterpart, the Venezuelan law does not specifically require a registration
statement per se to be filed with and approved by the Venezuelan National
Securities Commission (CNV)-Venezuela's equivalent to the SEC-prior to a
public offering of securities. Instead, the law provides for a standard list of
basic corporate information to be submitted to the CNV by any company
desiring to make a public offering." This information is subsequently
available for public inspection in the National Securities Register.
86
Venezuela's registration requirements are like American registration
statements in that they elicit similar information and are designed to provide
disclosure of key information which should aid investors in making a realistic
3015 U.S.C. § 78a et seq., (1970).
"Id. § 77e.
21d. § 77g, § 77j.
"Id. § 77g.
"Id. § 77j.
"1973 Law, art. 20, § 1-9, at 3-4.
'61d. arts. 14-16, at 3.
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appraisal of the merits of the securities and thus exercise an informed judg-
ment in deciding whether to purchase them.
The Venezuelan law differs from the 1933 Act in regard to the registration
requirements in another important aspect. The American law provides for
numerous exemptions from the registration requirement. Some of these
exemptions include: (1) private offerings to a limited number of people or in-
stitutions who have access to the type of information registration would dis-
close, and who do not redistribute the securities;87 (2) securities of govern-
mental instrumentalities, charitable institutions, and banks;8" (3) offerings not
in excess of certain specified amounts made in compliance with regulations of
the SEC.89 The Venezuelan law is much more comprehensive and exempts
from its regulation only public offerings of short-term notes (less than one
year), public debt securities, and those securities issued under the General
Banking Law." Query: if it were shown that registration requirements were
too burdensome for small- and medium-sized companies, then would it be
possible to induce more of these companies to make public offerings if less
stringent registration requirements were established for certain classes of of-
ferings? As it stands now there are few exemptions from the Venezuelan law's
registration requirements. In making this inquiry the author is well aware that
the registration requirements are designed to protect investors by providing
them with sufficient information to make an informed investment decision. A
factor also to be considered however, is whether these registration re-
quirements will deter companies from making public offerings, and if so, how
many companies.
One possibility is to authorize the CNV to exempt certain issuances from
registration requirements where it is not necessary in the public interest by
reason of the small amount involved or the limited character of the offering.
Obviously, a specified bolivar amount would have to be established as to when
a public offering becomes significant. Also, it would probably still be ad-
visable to require the issuer to file with the CNV either an abbreviated offering
circular or a brief notice form containing basic information about the stock
and its issuer.
The Venezuelan and American laws are also quite different in terms of pro-
spectus requirements. The Venezuelan law, unlike the 1933 Act, contains no
statutory prospectus requirements such as Section 10,9' whereby it is required
that investors be furnished with a prospectus containing the salient data set
" 15 U.S.C. § 77d (1970).
"Id. § 77c.
"Id.
"1973 Law, art. 1, at 2.
9'15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970).
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forth in the registration statement. Instead, the Venezuelan law simply re-
quires that any prospectus arising from the issuance of securities must be sub-
mitted to and approved by the CNV,12 and then goes on to provide specific
prospectus requirements if the selling circular is to be used in connection with a
public offering.93 These requirements are fairly comprehensive and include
submission of the text of the prospectus to be used in the public offering, in-
formation as to the end use of the funds being raised, financial data for the
previous four years, professional experience of the company's directors, and
information as to the manner in which the securities are to be distributed.94
The fact that the Venezuelan registration and prospectus information is not
required to be furnished to the investor appears to be a major shortcoming of
the law. Query: how effective will "public disclosure" of this vital registration
information be when the required information is merely "of public record"?
Will new and unsophisticated investors know without any difficulty where
such information is on file or how to readily obtain it? Would it not be more
effective to have a requirement that investors must be furnished with a pro-
spectus prior to making an investment decision?
Of special interest is the degree to which the Venezuelan registration and
prospectus requirements are somewhat more stringent than similar American
requirements. Under the Venezuelan scheme securities may not be offered
publicly until the registration information is filed with the CNV, and the pro-
spectus for the issue and any advertising or publicity associated with the issue
is first approved by the CNV. Approval or denial is forthcoming from the
CNV within 30 days after the respective information or documents are filed
with the CNV.9' This period can be extended by the CNV for no more than an
additional 30 days.96. Adverse decisions by the CNV can be brought before the
Commission for reconsideration within 10 days after the party of interest has
been notified of the original decision. In this case the CNV must rule on the
appeal within 30 days after it is filed.97 If the CNV denies the party's appeal,
then a final appeal from an adverse decision by the CNV can be brought
before the Political-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice
within 10 days after the CNV's decision. 98 The intent of the Venezuelan law
seems to be that a prospective investor will have at least thirty days in which to
study the key registration information necessary to make an informed and in-
telligent investment decision. Query: is the Venezuelan law ironclad in the
921973 Law, art. 10, § 7, at 2.
"Id. art. 20, § 10, at 3.
941d.
91Id. art. 23, at 4.
16/d.
"Id. art. 12, at 3.
" Id. art. 13, at 3.
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sense tha no public offering or any publicity associated with it may be
distributed in any form, oral or written, prior to approval by the CNV?
One particular provision of the law is troublesome since it appears to negate
much of the openness brought about by the registration and disclosure require-
ments. Although Article 16 specifically states that all documents, reports, and
data required under the law will be registered and accessible to anyone who
solicits the information, there is a further provision which gives the CNV the
power to designate any of this information as confidential and subjects anyone
who gives this classified information to the public to a specified fine.99 Ob-
viously, the potential for abuse here is tremendous, especially in view of the
traditional desire to maintain absolute secrecy surrounding any and all cor-
porate affairs. The author notes that this provision is quite vague, and pro-
vides no limits or guidelines as to how much information can be classified as
"confidential." Query: to what extent will Article 16 be used to defeat
registration and disclosure requirements and thereby preserve the traditional
veil of corporate secrecy provided by Articles 40 and 41 of the Venezuelan
Commercial Code?
A leading critic of the American securities regulation field notes that the
realities of the 1933 Act's registration process indicate that it does not work in
accordance with its underlying assumptions. 0 0 The original assumption of the
Act was that registration information would be filed and that the principal
features of the disclosure would be provided to the prospective investor,
thereby enabling him to make an informed investment decision.,' After the
filing of the registration information, the securities could be offered orally or
by certain summaries of the information in the registration statement-also
referred to as a preliminary "red herring" prospectus-as permitted by the
SEC rules.' 2 Release of the preliminary prospectus was designed to provide
basic registration information to the public before the registration statements
became effective. Release of the preliminary prospectus was especidlly impor-
tant in view of the fact that the Act provides that registration statements are ef-
fective on the 20th day after filing. The preliminary prospectus took on added
importance given the mass of information buried in the SEC's files, the short
time span for review by the SEC, and the public's desire to be provided with
basic information.
The problem, as Professor Kripke notes, is that there is no assurance that
the "red herrings" do reach prospective investors with any complete coverage.
"Id. art. 16, at 3.
.'Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1151,
1155 (Dec. 1970).
"'Id. 1155-57.
0215 U.S.C. § 77h (1970).
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Characterizing the existing situation as "ludicrous," he indicates that the final
definitive prospectus is not required to be, and routinely is not, delivered to the
investor until after he has committed himself. The Act as it now exists is of
value to most investors only if they study the incomplete "red herring" pro-
spectus. "3
One of the most important aspects of the Capital Markets Law was the crea-
tion of the National Securities Commission (Comision Nacional de Valores or
CNV).'14 An administrative agency modeled after the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission, the CNV is entrusted with regulating the entire
workings of the securities industry. The Commission is part of the executive
branch and is directly responsible to the Minister of Finance (Ministerio de
Hacienda).'° The president of the CNV serves a term of four years, while the
other four directors serve for three years each.0 °6
Qualifications for members of the Commission are fairly stringent.
Specifically required are prior experience in financial, economic, and commer-
cial matters. Special attention is directed toward preventing any conflicts of in-
terests or outside political pressures so as to ensure the independence and im-
partiality of the CNV.' °7
At the outset, though, it would seem that these requirements present
somewhat of a problem. It is recognized that these provisions are one step
toward the overall goal of developing standards of conduct for any person par-
ticipating in the capital market. This in turn is part of the primary aim of
creating justifiable investor confidence in the capital markets so as to en-
courage widespread public investor participation. The reality of adequately
recruiting and maintaining an independent and impartial agency staff such as
the CNV requires-given the present shortage of skilled and technically
qualified personnel in Venezuela'°-is somewhat difficult to reconcile with
the legislation. Further, if one accepts the belief that securities transactions
will increase substantially in the future, 0'° it would seem to follow that the
demands and duties placed on the CNV staff will increase and continue to ex-
pand.
At present, the Venezuelan civil service nominally functions under a system
of merit and competitive examination. In practice, however, it is a spoils
'
0 3Kripke, supra note 100, at 1155-56.
10'1973 Law, art. 2, at 2.
'051d.
'
0 6Id. arts. 3-4, at 2.
'"Id. art. 5, at 2.
"'Keep It in Cash, ECONOMIST, April 17, 1976, at 73.
"'This assumption is possible in view of the increasing volume and amount of securities transac-
tions, and also by the government's stated goal of making Caracas a major international financial
center. Calatchi, Venezuela's Capital Market Takes on an International Flavour, EUROMONEY,
April, 1976, at 53-57.
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system which fosters little or no continuity. This problem is compounded by
two additional factors-a wage scale which is lower than in private industry,
and the absence of a strong tradition of honest and efficient management in
the civil service. Clearly this is part of a much larger administrative problem
which is not in any way limited only to the CNV. The implications are serious
nonetheless." 0 "' In an early article dealing with the Capital Markets Law, it
was noted that the proper functioning of the market required a legal organism
which inspired the confidence of the public investor so as to promote a greater
acceptance of the securities issued. The cornerstone of this confidence was to
be the CNV."' Given the currently bleak administrative situation, and an im-
mediate future which holds little prospect for improvement, will the ability of
the Commission to function effectively be seriously hindered? If, in fact, the
CNV fails to maintain its independence and impartiality, it would appear that
no amount of legislation would be effective in winning widespread investor
confidence.
How extensive is the regulatory power of the CNV? Theoretically, the
powers and duties of the Commission are quite broad, and center around the
authority to approve or deny any application to make a public offering." 3
Basically, any "public offering" of title securities falls within the regulatory
power of the CNV.'"', '' By definition, "securities" mean "the shares of
companies and other instruments issued in large numbers which possess iden-
tical characteristics and grant the same rights within their class.""' "Public
offer of securities" is defined as "any offer made to the public or to sectors or
to determined groups by means of advertising or publicity.""' The author
notes that both of these latter definitions are vague and imprecise and could be
the cause of uncertainty and confusion. In regard to the definition of
"securities," there is no indication or clarification as to what number of in-
struments constitutes "large" so as to fall within Article 18's definition. In
regard to the definition of "public offer of securities," there is no clarification
of what is meant by "advertising or publicity." Query: does this include all
forms of oral and written communication to the public or to potential in-
vestors? Does this include all forms of solicitation of investors?
Although it is not certain, it would appear that a generous delegation of
authority to the CNV was provided in Article 19 of the law so as to deal with
"'Rebel with a Cause, ECONOMIST, Dec. 27, 1975, at Survey 10.
... Venezuela: Uncomfortable Audit, LATIN AMERICA, June 25, 1976, at 198.
"'Wiles, The Venezuelan Capital Markets Law, 8 INT'L LAW. 305, 306 (1974).
'"1973 Law, art. 10, at 3.
'"Id. arts. 1-2, at 2.
"'Short-term notes, public debt securities, and securities issued under the Banking Law are
covered by prior legislation.
"1973 Law, art. 18, at 3.
"'Id. art. 19, at 3.
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any ambiguities or uncertainties.' I The Article provides that any doubt (as to
whether there exists a public offering) is left to the discretion of the CNV.'' 9
One of the functions of the CNV is to act as a collector and disseminator of
securities information which is now required to be on record. One manner in
which the Commission is supposed to accomplish this is by issuing regular
reports on the capital markets so as to keep the investing public and the Na-
tional Executive fully informed.' 2 The depository for this newly obtained in-
formation is the National Securities Register.' 2' As was noted previously in the
section dealing with registration and disclosure requirements, all information
required under the law for a company making a public offering is now
theoretically available to anyone who solicits it.'22
The CNV's role of acting as collector and disseminator of registration and
prospectus information is important in both a symbolic and a real sense. A
governmental agency with real authority now possesses the means by which it
is able to pierce the veil of secrecy which companies, both foreign'23 and na-
tional, have traditionally relied upon in areas such as the keeping of books and
accounts. Without doubt, this authority and the effective use of it is absolutely
essential if there is to be widespread public investor confidence.
The means by which the CNV is able to pierce the previously almost im-
penetrable veil of corporate secrecy is provided by Article 21 of the law.' 4 The
broad grant of authority in this provision seems to give the CNV an almost
unlimited right to inspect company books to effectuate the purpose of the
law.' 25 This provision does not specifically provide a shareholder with an
unlimited right of inspection, but it does seemingly provide a shareholder or
potential investor with the opportunity-at least indirectly through the
CNV-to overcome the Venezuelan Commercial Code's previous prohibition
against inspection of company books by minority shareholders or government
officials.' 26
At the heart of any regulatory scheme is the threat of sanctions being impos-
ed upon violators of the laws. The Venezuelan Capital Markets Law provides




211d. art. 10, at 3.
"'Id. arts. 14-16, at 3.
22d.
"'In the case of American based transnational companies this obsession for secrecy is somewhat
paradoxical, since by the United States federal securities legislation much of this same information
is already of public record.
' 1973 Law, art. 21, at 4.
'251d.
" Codigo de Comercio, arts. 40-41, at 110-13.
1'1973 Law, arts. 136-47, at 14.
'Ild. arts. 148-50, at 15.
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Once again the Federal Securities Act of 1933 provides a measure of com-
parison with the Venezuelan law's enforcement provision. The 1933 Act pro-
vides both civil and criminal sanctions for violation of its registration re-
quirements, and for any fraud in connection with the issuance of the securities
or the filing of the registration statement. Under Section 11 of the Act, '29 if the
registration statement, when it becomes effective, contains a misstatement or
omission of material fact, any person acquiring the securities without
knowledge thereof is entitled to maintain an action for damages.' 30
The Act, pursuant to Section 12, also expressly imposes civil liability on any
person who offers or sells a security in violation of Section 5 (registration and
prospectus requirements) or through means of interstate commerce or the
mails by use of material misstatements or omissions.' 3' In addition, Section 17
of the Act makes it unlawful for any person to offer or sell securities through
the mails or in interstate commerce by means of any device or scheme to
defraud or by means of any misstatement or omission of material fact.'"
Unlike Sections 11 and 12, which expressly create a right of action for viola-
tion, Section 17 provides for civil and criminal liability by implication. This
provision is also referred to as the General Anti-Fraud Section of the 1933 Act.
Unlike its American counterpart, the Venezuelan law does not have three
separate enforcement provisions. Instead, it provides express administrative
and penal sanctions. The most serious administrative sanctions carry with
them fines ranging from 10,000 to 40,000 bolivars. '33,'34 This section appears
to be more closely related to Section 12 (imposition of general civil liability) of
the 1933 Act, in the sense that the Venezuelan provision aims at punishing
violations of the registration requirements.' 35
Article 147 of the Venezuelan law provides for lesser fines, ranging from
2,000 to 20,000 bolivars. 36 The section also appears to be related to Section 12
of the 1933 Act, since its emphasis is also toward punishing violations of both
registration and prospectus requirements.' 37
Imposition of fines under the above mentioned provisions is not to be taken
lightly. Failure to pay penalties assessed under these sections can result in the
imposition of prison sentences not to exceed six months.'




1'1973 Law, art. 146, at 14.
4.3 bolivars equal 1.0 U.S. dollars.
111973 Law, art. 146, at 14.
"Ild. art. 147, at 14.
37Id.
'3"Id. art. 137, at 14.
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What is probably the strongest and potentially most widely applicable
Venezuelan enforcement provision is Article 148.111 This provision subjects
directors and company employees to prison terms ranging from two to six
years when in the course of dealing in public securities transactions they pro-
vide false information regarding the operations or financial condition of the
company with the object of obtaining some benefit or profit for themselves or
others.'4I This provision can be looked upon as being similar to Section 17 of
the 1933 Act since they both specifically make unlawful any fraud arising from
the sale of securities.
The enforcement provisions of the Venezuelan law are quite different from
those of the 1933 Act. Article 142 of the Venezuelan law provides that the ad-
ministrative sanctions are to be imposed by the CNV.' 4 Appeal from an
adverse decision by the CNV in this case is somewhat unique, since it must first
be appealed to the Minister of Finance within five days after the sanction is im-
posed. 142 The Minister's decision, if also adverse, can be appealed within a five
day period after the decision is rendered.' 4 3 Appeal in this instance is to be
made before the Political-Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Justice. As a condition to any appeal before the Supreme Court however, the
appealing party must have first paid the fine which was originally imposed by
the CNV.14
4
Significantly, the Venezuelan law, unlike the 1933 Act, does not create any
right of the shareholder to bring a private cause of action. Further, nowhere in
the law is there any provision for any type of class action or shareholders
derivative suit. Protection of shareholder interests under the Venezuelan
Capital Markets Law is vested solely in the CNV. Query: would not the
Venezuelan law be much more effective in terms of ensuring investor con-
fidence and corporate compliance with registration and disclosure re-
quirements if a private right of action had been expressly provided to remedy
violations of the law? One possibility is to provide that investors be entitled to
recover damages resulting from the company's noncompliance with disclosure
requirements or from other deceptive practices in connection with securities
transactions. Also, the law could provide that in an action for damages or
rescission that there will be a lighter burden of proof for the investor and a
much greater burden of proof on the defendants.
"'Id. art. 148, at 14-15.
1401d.
'Id. art. 142, at 14.
1421d.
14'Id. art. 143, at 14.
1441d.
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